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2.1    Introduction
In 2004, roughly 13 million children in the United States were living below 
the poverty line. While social programs enacted since the Great Society have 
done a great deal to mitigate the immediate eﬀects of poverty, education 
has become increasingly important in escaping poverty. The returns to edu-
cation, and to skill, have increased dramatically over the past forty years. 
Where it was once possible to earn a productive living with only the most 
rudimentary of academic skills, it is increasingly diﬃcult to ﬁ  nd a job that 
oﬀers a living wage with anything less than a college degree (Murnane and 
Levy 1996).
At the same time, poor children attend schools that appear worse on a 
number of dimensions. In 2004, high- poverty districts received nearly $1,000 
less per pupil in state and local revenues than low- poverty districts within the 
same state (Education Trust 2006). According to a recent analysis by Educa-
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tion Week, only 65 percent of teachers in high- poverty districts in California 
met the new federal guidelines for highly qualiﬁ  ed teachers in 2005, com-
pared to 81 percent in low- poverty districts in the state (Keller 2005). In New 
York, 81 percent of teachers in high-  poverty districts were highly qualiﬁ  ed, 
compared to almost 100 percent in low-  poverty areas.1
These facts have spurred many initiatives to improve school quality for 
disadvantaged children. For example, over the past three decades a number 
of states have passed school ﬁ  nance reforms to reduce disparities in revenues 
and to guarantee a minimum adequate level of spending for districts with 
diﬃcult-  to-  educate student populations. The federal government also tar-
gets aid to schools with high poverty rates through the Title I program. Com-
plementary policies have been introduced to ensure that available resources 
are used eﬀectively, such as state charter school laws that allow alternative 
schools to compete with the traditional public schools and the federal No 
Child Left Behind school accountability legislation that requires states to 
adopt universal testing and minimum performance standards.
While it certainly seems plausible that attending a better school should 
improve student achievement, the existing evidence is far from clear. For 
example, many studies have shown that schools (and districts) with higher 
per pupil expenditures do not necessarily have higher achievement scores 
than schools (and districts) with less spending (Hanushek 1997). Similarly, 
recent evidence suggests that certiﬁ  ed teachers are not substantially better 
at raising student performance than uncertiﬁ  ed teachers (Boyd et al. 2005; 
Kane, Rockoﬀ, and Staiger 2006). More generally, evidence from a recent 
housing mobility experiment suggests that poor children whose families are 
given the opportunity to move to a lower poverty neighborhood do not show 
improvement on a variety of academic measures, even after living in their 
new neighborhood for up to seven years (Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007).
In addition, technical shortcomings of many of the studies in this litera-
ture make them diﬃcult to interpret. The key diﬃculty is that families and 
students choose schools often at the same time they choose where to live. 
This means that characteristics of the chosen school may signal something 
about the child, such as level of motivation or degree of family support, 
rather than serving solely as an independent measure of the quantity and 
quality of inputs applied to the student. Resources will appear eﬀective if 
otherwise able students tend to attend high resource schools, while they will 
appear ineﬀective if more resources are applied to less able students, as is the 
case with many state and federal compensatory education programs.
Hence, the importance of school quality is an open question. This is not 
simply an academic issue. As a society, we are faced with a number of impor-
1. See Clotfelter et al. (2007) for evidence on similar disparities across high and low poverty 
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tant tradeoﬀs between competing goods—a cleaner environment, better 
health care, international aid, and so forth. Of course, one can argue that 
we are a wealthy country and can aﬀord to have higher quality education for 
poor children as well as these other important goods. However, there is then 
the question of what is the most eﬀective way to achieve a better education 
for disadvantaged children. Given the multiple disadvantages faced by poor 
families and the multiplicity of support services, along with the uncertainty 
regarding the impact of school quality on student outcomes, simply attend-
ing a better school may not be the most eﬀective intervention.
In this chapter, we ﬁ  rst review the existing evidence more completely and 
then provide new evidence on whether expanded access to sought-  after 
schools can improve achievement. The setting we study is the “open enroll-
ment” system in the Chicago Public Schools (CPS). Elementary students in 
Chicago can apply to gain access to public magnet schools and programs 
outside of their neighborhood school, but within the same school district. 
We use lottery data to avoid the critical issue of nonrandom selection of stu-
dents into schools. All but a handful of academically advanced elementary 
schools use lotteries to allocate spots when oversubscribed, and we ana-
lyze nearly 450 lotteries for kindergarten and ﬁ  rst grade slots at thirty-  two 
popular schools in 2000 and 2001. Since those who randomly win and lose 
any given lottery will on average have the same characteristics, we can obtain 
unbiased estimates of the impact of gaining access to one of these schools 
through a straightforward comparison of subsequent mean outcomes across 
the two groups, as long as there is not selective attrition.
Comparing lottery winners and losers, we ﬁ  nd that lottery winners attend 
higher quality schools as measured by both the average achievement level 
of peers in the school as well as by value-  added indicators of the school’s 
contribution to student learning. Yet tracking students for up to ﬁ  ve years 
following the application, we do not ﬁ  nd that winning a lottery systemati-
cally confers any evident academic beneﬁ  ts. This suggests that the strong 
cross- sectional relationship that we observe between test score performance 
and school quality for the typical CPS elementary student is largely spuri-
ous, and highlights the importance of using a research design that compares 
likes to likes.
In the discussion section following, we explore several possible explana-
tions for our ﬁ  ndings, including the possibility that the typical student may 
be choosing schools for nonacademic reasons (e.g., safety, proximity) and/ or 
may experience beneﬁ  ts along dimensions we are unable to measure. Regard-
less of the explanation, the lack of a robust relationship between access to 
sought-  after schools and achievement undermines the practical relevance 
of relying solely on enhanced school choice or higher inputs to remedy 
existing achievement gaps. Moreover, our cross-  sectional results support 
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observed system-  wide across race/  ethnicity and income subgroups persist 
across students within schools.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews 
the most relevant prior literature. Section 2.3 describes our data and empiri-
cal strategy. Section 2.4 presents our results, and section 2.5 discusses the 
implications of our ﬁ  ndings for the construction of policies to beneﬁ  t dis-
advantaged children.
2.2    Literature  Review
This section begins by deﬁ  ning school quality and describing the potential 
channels through which school quality may inﬂ  uence student outcomes. We 
then provide a broad overview of the existing evidence on the strength and 
nature of the link between school quality and student outcomes. Rather than 
attempt to provide an exhaustive summary of ﬁ  ndings, we emphasize the 
strengths and weaknesses of the variety of methods used.
2.2.1    Conceptual  Framework
School quality is a complex and multidimensional concept. There are 
many ways that one might deﬁ  ne school quality and, thus, many ways in 
which school quality might inﬂ  uence student outcomes. One of the most 
straightforward deﬁ  nitions of school quality involves the ﬁ  nancial and 
other “tangible” resources available to students and teachers, including 
things such as adequate textbooks, new computers, clean and spacious 
classrooms, small class sizes, and highly qualiﬁ  ed teachers. The theoretical 
mechanisms through which these factors could inﬂ  uence student perfor-
mance are straightforward, even if there continue to be ﬁ  erce debates about 
the actual empirical relationship between such resources and outcomes.
Another common measure of school quality involves the students them-
selves. Schools with higher performing and/  or more motivated peers are 
often considered higher quality due to the inﬂ  uence that one’s peers and 
their families have on one’s own outcomes. Peers are thought to inﬂ  uence 
individual outcomes in a number of ways, from providing good role models 
(e.g., friends that think studying is “cool”) to changing the expectations of 
the teacher and thus the pace and content of classroom curriculum (e.g., to 
the extent that the teacher focuses attention on the median or modal stu-
dent in the class, higher-  achieving peers may translate into a more rigorous 
curriculum).
There is a third aspect of school quality—the quality of the match between 
the school and an individual student—that is not as frequently discussed 
in the traditional literature. The focus on “match quality” recognizes that 
students have diﬀerent learning styles and/  or needs, and that what might be 
beneﬁ  cial for one student might be benign or detrimental to another student. 
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programs, including charters and public school choice programs like the one 
analyzed in this chapter.
Given the multitude of channels through which various aspects of school 
quality could inﬂ  uence student outcomes, is it plausible to imagine that 
there might not be a relationship between school quality and student per-
formance? While there is no way to be certain, several factors suggest that 
this relationship might not be particularly strong. First, there is considerable 
evidence on the primitive importance of the family, both in terms of genes 
and environment. Second, there are undoubtedly important interactions 
between home and school, some of which might serve to mitigate the impor-
tance of school quality. If, for example, parents view their ﬁ  nancial or other 
support as, at least in part, a substitute for formal schooling, then we might 
expect parents to become more involved when their child is faced with an 
incompetent teacher or under-  resourced school (e.g., they may seek out an 
after- school program or help the child more with their schoolwork at home). 
This type of behavior, while completely natural, will serve to undermine the 
relationship between school quality and student achievement. Third, unlike 
previous generations in this country and current generations in many devel-
oping countries, the vast majority of children in the United States today 
have what one might consider the bare essentials of an education. If school 
quality is most important at the very low and very high levels of quality, it 
may be that we simply cannot detect any important relationship in current 
U.S. data.
2.2.2    Existing  Evidence
Researchers have long sought to examine how school quality inﬂ  uences 
child outcomes. This research falls into two broad categories. Perhaps the 
most common approach to this problem has been to measure the impact 
of observable school inputs such as spending per pupil, student-  teacher 
ratios, and teacher credentials on student outcomes. Studies that analyze the 
impact of policies that dramatically reallocated resources, such as desegrega-
tion and school ﬁ  nance equalization, ﬁ  nd a modest convergence in educa-
tional outcomes across previously advantaged and disadvantaged students 
(e.g., Card and Krueger 1996; Card and Payne 2002). But, the literature 
to date has yielded mixed results regarding the ability of policymakers to 
inﬂ  uence educational outcomes through less radical adjustments to the set 
of inputs to the educational process. See Hanushek (1997) for an overview 
of this literature, and Hanushek et al. (2005), Rockoﬀ (2004), and Aaronson, 
Barrow, and Sander (2007) for recent evidence on the impact of observable 
teacher characteristics on value- added. There is a related and vast literature 
that seeks to estimate the impact of peer characteristics on individual edu-
cational outcomes, also with mixed results (Hoxby 2000; Zimmerman 2003; 
Graham 2004; Lefgren 2004).
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of school quality research that has focused on private schools and other 
“choice” schools. Studies in this strand have sought to compare the per-
formance of students in public versus private schools, or traditional public 
schools versus magnet or charter schools, as a way to say something about 
the beneﬁ  ts of attending a “choice” school which, by its nature, is presum-
ably “better” along some important dimension. Unfortunately, estimating 
a causal relationship between access to sought-  after schools and student 
outcomes has proven diﬃcult. In the United States, observational studies of 
private schools (Coleman, Hoﬀer, and Kilgore 1982; Bryk, Lee, and Holland 
1993) and magnet schools (Blank 1983; Gamoran 1996) ﬁ  nd that students 
who attend these schools experience better educational outcomes. But these 
studies suﬀer from a potentially important source of bias driven by the fact 
that children who attend private or “nontraditional” public schools may 
diﬀer from their peers in ways that are diﬃcult to capture in a statistical anal-
ysis, but may nonetheless be quite important in determining life outcomes.
The diﬃculty in drawing conclusions from comparing outcomes for stu-
dents served in diﬀerent schooling settings is clearly evident in the public 
debate over charter schools. The American Federation of Teachers (Nelson, 
Rosenberg, and Van Meter 2004) produced a study comparing the achieve-
ment of students in traditional and charter schools using national NAEP 
test score data, ﬁ  nding results unfavorable to charter schools. The study has 
been strongly criticized for controlling for so few of the diﬀerences in char-
acteristics in the student populations, particularly given that many charter 
schools are explicitly designed to serve at- risk students. A concurrent Hoxby 
(2004) study compares charter and public school student performance in 
neighboring schools with similar racial compositions, and comes to a starkly 
diﬀerent conclusion. However, the ﬁ  ndings of this study have also been chal-
lenged because of the relative crudeness of the school matching procedure 
(Carnoy et al. 2005).
Researchers have attempted to address these selection concerns in several 
ways. One method is to use longitudinal student level data, so that the same 
student can be tracked in diﬀerent settings. If a student’s prior test score 
serves as a summary statistic for that student’s potential, then any changes 
from the baseline as compared to similarly able students can be attributed 
to the schooling choice. More recently, researchers have recognized that 
students diﬀer not only in their current level of achievement, but also in 
their learning trajectory. Even more problematic for school choice studies, 
students may choose to switch schools in response to unexpectedly good 
or bad outcomes. Although some studies rely exclusively on past outcome 
histories to control for student heterogeneity, most incorporate these data 
along with other strategies.
One alternative method, instrumental variables, attempts to identify 
diﬀerences in access to and take-  up of school choice options that are argu-
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pensities to achieve and learn. A number of researchers have attempted to use 
this strategy to ascertain the causal impact of attending a Catholic school. 
In an early inﬂ  uential paper, for example, Evans and Schwab (1995) use 
aﬃliation with the Catholic church as an instrument for attending a Catholic 
school. The idea here is that students who are aﬃliated with the Catholic 
church are more likely than other students to attend Catholic schools, so that 
one can infer the eﬀectiveness of Catholic schooling by comparing the edu-
cational outcomes of Catholic children with those of other children (regard-
less of whether the student in particular attends Catholic school). Of course, 
the key assumption underlying this strategy is that Catholic children do not 
diﬀer from other children in any way that (a) researchers cannot control for 
in their model and (b) will inﬂ  uence educational outcomes through channels 
other than attending a Catholic school. To support this assumption, Evans 
and Schwab (1995) document that Catholics are very close to the national 
average on a variety of socioeconomic indicators. However, as others have 
noted, Catholics may well diﬀer from others in less easily measurable ways 
that could still have an important impact on schooling outcomes (Neal 1997; 
Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005).
One straightforward example pointed out by Neal (1997) is that students 
who attend Catholic schools might be more likely to self-  report that they 
are aﬃliated with the Catholic church, regardless of their families’ religious 
aﬃliations, which would introduce a mechanical correlation that could 
bias the results. Instead, Neal (1997) uses a student’s proximity to Catholic 
schools as an instrument for attending this type of school. Insofar as stu-
dents who live near Catholic schools are more likely to attend them, this is 
a plausible instrument. The assumption of this approach, however, is that 
a family’s residential location—speciﬁ  cally whether it is close to a Catholic 
school or not—is not associated with any unmeasured family characteris-
tics that might inﬂ  uence a student’s outcomes independent of the type of 
school the student attends. This assumption would be violated not only if 
neighborhoods with Catholic schools tend to be somewhat wealthier, for 
example, than other neighborhoods, but also if such neighborhoods are 
diﬀerent in less tangible ways, such as having a greater sense of community 
(or what is often referred to in the sociology literature as social capital). 
Given the diﬃculty of ﬁ  nding a valid instrument, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that these studies have found mixed eﬀects, with some showing beneﬁ  ts 
(Evans and Schwab 1995) and others showing little or no eﬀect (Sander 
1996; Neal 1997).
More recently, there have been a series of studies that exploit randomized 
lotteries. The Milwaukee voucher program, oﬀering vouchers to a limited 
number of low- income students to attend one of three private nonsectarian 
schools in the district, is the most prominent of these. Although in theory ran-
domization provides an ideal context for evaluating the beneﬁ  ts of expand-
ing students’ choice sets, in the Milwaukee case less than half of the unsuc-50        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
cessful applicants returned to the public schools and those who did return 
were from less educated, lower income families (Witte 1997). As described 
in greater detail following, this type of selective attrition can seriously bias 
any statistical analysis of student outcomes. It is therefore not surprising that 
analyses of the Milwaukee program obtain sharply conﬂ  icting estimates of 
the impact on achievement depending upon the assumptions made to deal 
with the attrition of lottery losers from the sample (Witte, Sterr, and Thorn 
1995; Greene, Peterson, and Du 1997; Witte 1997; Rouse 1998).
Evidence from other small- scale school choice experiments in the United 
States is similarly mixed. For example, Peterson, Myers, and Howell (1998) 
and Howell and Peterson (2002) ﬁ  nd that the opportunity to attend a private 
school modestly increases student achievement for low-  achieving African-
  American students in New York City, Dayton, and Washington, D.C. A 
reanalysis of the New York City experiment by Krueger and Zhu (2003), 
however, suggests that even claims of modest beneﬁ  ts may be overstated.
Our own prior work examining the impact of attending magnet high 
schools in Chicago (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006) is part of the growing 
set of studies relying on explicit randomization. A comparison between 
lottery winners and losers reveals that students who win attend better high 
schools along a number of dimensions, including higher peer achievement 
and attainment levels. Nonetheless, we ﬁ  nd little evidence that winning a 
lottery provides any systematic beneﬁ  t across a wide variety of traditional 
academic measures. Lottery winners do, however, experience improvements 
on a subset of nontraditional outcome measures, such as self-  reported dis-
ciplinary incidents and arrest rates.
Recent work examining public school choice in the Charlotte- Mecklenburg 
School District (CMSD) highlights the importance of accounting for het-
erogeneity in treatment eﬀects. Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006) measure 
the impact of attending one’s “ﬁ  rst choice” school by comparing outcomes 
of lottery winners and losers. And, like Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006), they 
ﬁ  nd that winning the lottery (and, thus, attending a desired school) has, on 
average, no impact on a student’s academic performance, but does seem to 
moderate at least some nonacademic outcomes.
The primary innovation of the analysis is that the authors use informa-
tion from parental rankings of up to three most- preferred schools on school 
choice application forms to infer the weight that each family places on aca-
demics. For example, parents that passed up nearby schools and chose a 
high-  achieving school farther from their house were assumed to place a 
high value on academics. When the authors incorporate this information 
into their analysis, they ﬁ  nd that those students whose parents place a high 
weight on academics experience signiﬁ  cant test score gains from attending 
their ﬁ  rst- choice school, while those whose parents place little value on aca-
demics actually experience test score declines from attending their desired 
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likelihood that winners end up attending a school with higher test scores, 
but rather appear to be attributable to improvements in idiosyncratic match 
quality. If in fact true, the policy implications are unclear, since the schools 
that deliver achievement gains for the subset of highly motivated parents 
and students do not seem to confer gains more generally.2
In this chapter, we further explore the impact of attending a choice school, 
considering elementary school students in Chicago Public Schools. An 
important limitation of our high school study is that the results may not 
generalize to younger students. It may be that high school is too late for 
students to beneﬁ  t from improvements in their schooling environment, so 
that the option to attend a magnet school may have a stronger impact on 
students at younger ages (Heckman 2007; Heckman and Masterov 2007). 
We also attempt—within the constraints of the available data—to test for 
the presence of heterogeneous eﬀects by preference for academics following 
the lead of Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006).
2.3      Data and Empirical Strategy
This section describes the data and methodology for our analysis of 
elementary school students in Chicago. We start by describing the school 
system and its choice program, and then explain how we use the lottery data 
to estimate the academic return to attending a better school.
2.3.1      Background on the Chicago Public Schools
Over 400,000 students are enrolled in the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) in 
grades K through 12. As in most urban districts, students in the system are 
disproportionately minority (more than two-  thirds) and poverty rates are 
well above those for the nation as a whole. Given the high rates of disadvan-
tage and poor overall performance relative to national norms, our analysis 
provides evidence on the net beneﬁ  ts of providing choice to students with 
otherwise limited opportunities.
The Chicago Public Schools has one of the most extensive school choice 
programs available.3 At the elementary school level, each student is guar-
anteed admission to an assigned neighborhood school, but can also apply 
to any of at least 200 CPS magnet schools or regular schools with magnet 
2. While the study is carefully done, there are still reasons to question the validity of the 
ﬁ  ndings. It seems likely that whether high-  preference students ultimately enroll in a CMSD 
school will be more sensitive to whether they win or not, so that the degree of attrition could 
be directly related to measured preferences and potentially generate the observed pattern of 
ﬁ  ndings. Below, we show evidence that diﬀerential attrition does vary systematically across 
similar sample splits in the Chicago setting.
3. School choice was ﬁ  rst instituted in Chicago in response to a 1980 desegregation consent 
decree with the federal government. The goal of the consent decree was to create schools that 
roughly matched the racial composition of the school system. Since that time, the size and scope 
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programs. Indeed, more than a third of all elementary students in CPS in 
2000 and 2001 elected to attend a school other than the school assigned.
In order to attend a school other than the assigned school, a student must 
submit an application in the spring of the preceding year.4 A student must 
reside within the school district, but does not need to be currently enrolled 
in CPS in order to submit an application. Moreover, the application pro-
cess is extremely easy. Parents simply ﬁ  ll out a one-  page form listing basic 
information such as their name and address, and the grade the student will 
be entering. They can either mail the form into the district oﬃce, or drop it 
oﬀ at their home school. There is no limit on the number of schools to which 
a student can apply. In most cases, if the number of applicants exceeds the 
number of available positions, randomized lotteries are used to determine 
the allocation of spots. For a limited number of selective programs admis-
sion is based on criteria such as test scores, and lotteries are not used.
For programs using lotteries, there are explicit rules governing the way 
in which the lotteries are conducted. Because of desegregation goals and 
variation in the number of available slots at diﬀerent grade levels, lotteries 
are typically conducted separately for each gender- race- grade combination. 
Also, a particular school may house multiple magnet programs, each of 
which conducts separate lotteries. As a consequence, one school can poten-
tially have a large number of lotteries each year.5
2.3.2    The  Data
Working with CPS, we obtained access to detailed administrative data 
that provide us information on student enrollment and achievement for all 
students over a number of years. Moreover, unique CPS student identiﬁ  ca-
tion numbers allow us to track students over time as they change schools or 
if they leave and then reenter the school system.
For the purpose of this study, we obtained data on school choice applica-
tions submitted in spring 2000 and 2001 for enrollment in the following fall. 
The application data include the name, race, gender, date of birth, home 
address, and grade of each applicant, as well as the program the student is 
applying to, whether that application was part of a lottery and, if so, whether 
the application was selected or not. In our prior work, we examined students 
applying to high school (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006). Here, we focus on 
students applying to kindergarten and ﬁ  rst grade, which are the principal 
entry grades for elementary school. The subset of the applicants attend-
4. Transportation is provided to students gaining access to elementary magnet schools (but 
not to magnet school programs housed in neighborhood schools) if they live more than 1.5 
miles but less than six miles from the school.
5. There is a further layer of complexity with regard to lotteries, namely that schools also 
reserve a share of available seats and conduct special lotteries for siblings of current students 
(“sibling lotteries”) and for students who live nearby (“proximity lotteries”). Because such lot-
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ing public school at the time of the application (32 percent) report their 
unique CPS identiﬁ  cation number directly on the application, and this can 
be directly used to link students to the administrative records.6 For the other 
applicants, we utilize a probabilistic matching technique to link applicants 
to subsequent administrative records using name, date of birth, gender, and 
race/ ethnicity.7
The full sample of applications for kindergarten and ﬁ  rst grade openings 
includes 51,775 applications to 207 choice elementary schools. Only ten of 
these schools are academically advanced schools that have selective test-
  based admissions policies. While nearly one in every ﬁ  ve applications is to 
these schools, less than one percent of elementary school students and six 
percent of applicants are served by these schools. All other schools assign 
slots by randomized lotteries if oversubscribed.
Given our research design—which involves comparing students who won 
a lottery with their peers who lost the same lottery—our analysis is necessar-
ily limited to the set of lotteries where there were at least some winners and 
losers. Among applications to lottery schools, 50.2 percent were to lotteries 
with both winners and losers, 42.0 percent were to lotteries with no winners 
and 7.8 percent were to lotteries with no losers. A lottery will not have any 
winners if the campus is unable to accept applications to a speciﬁ  c grade due 
to overcrowding. Since we cannot estimate any treatment eﬀects, we exclude 
applications to both types of degenerate lotteries from our analysis.
Two factors drive diﬀerences in the availability of slots for applicants 
across lottery schools and, hence, determine whether a campus is included 
in our analysis or not. First, much of the variation in capacity is geographic, 
with space constraints pervasive in the booming neighborhoods in the 
Northwest, Southwest, and South regions of the city (Neighborhood Capi-
tal Budget Group 1999). Second, the availability of any slots for applicants 
at the entry grade levels is only an issue for neighborhood schools that house 
magnet programs, since these schools have to ﬁ  rst accommodate students 
living in the attendance zone. The overcrowded choice schools are neighbor-
hood schools concentrated in the congested regions that otherwise appear 
similar on observable dimensions (e.g., average achievement level) to the 
campuses included in our analysis, while the schools that hold uncontested 
lotteries are substantially lower-  performing.
After excluding another 10.8 percent of applications to nondegenerate 
lotteries at schools with fewer than 100 lottery participants across the two 
cohorts, we are left with 15,403 applications from 7,469 students to thirty-
  two schools. The great majority of the applications (79.1 percent) are for 
6. The fraction applying from inside CPS is, not surprisingly, lower for pre-  kindergarten 
applicants to kindergarten slots (24.7 percent). For applicants to ﬁ  rst grade slots, the fraction 
is 42.9 percent.
7. The matching process works extremely well. We verify that we correctly identify nearly 95 
percent of students with an existing CPS ID at the time of application.54        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
kindergarten slots. Most of the schools (twenty-  two) are magnet schools 
that accept students from throughout the district and organize the curricu-
lum around a speciﬁ  c theme (e.g., math/  science, humanities, ﬁ  ne arts, or 
world language). No students are assigned to these schools by default. The 
remaining schools also serve neighborhood students, but enrollment is dom-
inated by students from outside the neighborhood drawn to magnet pro-
grams housed at the schools. Overall, these lotteries are quite competitive, 
with the typical application having a 13.3 percent chance of being selected. 
Because a student can apply to multiple lotteries, roughly one out of every 
four students in the sample wins at least one lottery.
We examine student outcomes through the spring of 2005, when those 
applying to kindergarten from our 2000 cohort will have progressed to fourth 
grade, and those applying to ﬁ  rst grade will have progressed to ﬁ  fth grade. 
Applicants from the 2001 cohort can be tracked for only four, rather than 
ﬁ  ve, years subsequent to the application. We are able to track students as 
long as, and only if, they are enrolled in CPS. Among our outcome measures 
for applicants who attend CPS schools are indicators for whether the student 
is currently receiving special education services and whether the student has 
been retained (i.e., is repeating a grade).
The academic outcomes that we focus on most are achievement test 
scores. Students in CPS take the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS), which is a 
nationally- normed multiple- choice exam that measures student proﬁ  ciency 
in reading comprehension and a variety of basic math skills. The tests are 
mandatory and universally administered to CPS elementary students, start-
ing in third grade. In our sample, more than 99 percent of students enrolled 
in these grades have valid test score data, including students who receive spe-
cial education or bilingual education services. Schools have discretion over 
whether to administer the tests to ﬁ  rst and second grade students (none do 
to kindergarteners), so that some elementary schools assess students using 
the ITBS exams while others use alternative assessments for which results 
are not automatically reported to the district. We observe ITBS scores for 
79.8 percent of enrolled ﬁ  rst grade students, and for 87.1 percent of second 
grade students. The choice to administer ITBS at these grade levels appears 
to be idiosyncratic, since the schools that choose to do so do not diﬀer in 
systematic ways from the schools that do not.8
The reading and math tests are designed so that a student’s scores across 
grades can be mapped to a rate of learning. The scale is set so that a score 
of 185 represents achievement of the typical student in the nation in third 
grade, and a score of 200 is the same for fourth grade. Typical national 
achievement gains steadily decline from 15 points for fourth graders to 11 
points for eighth graders, reﬂ  ecting the idea that younger students learn 
8. This is also supported by the ﬁ  ndings in table 1.6 that enrolled lottery winners are no more 
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more than older ones. The major advantage of using these standard scores 
is that a one unit change represents the same amount of learning regardless 
of the location on the scale, which facilitates comparisons across students 
in diﬀerent grades and at diﬀerent points in time.
2.3.3    Empirical  Strategy
In theory, lottery-  induced randomization provides a simple solution to 
the problem of endogenous sorting of students. Because lottery outcomes 
are randomly assigned, winners and losers of a particular lottery will be 
identical on average, in terms of unobservable as well as observable char-
acteristics. Consequently, a simple diﬀerence of observed mean outcomes 
between students who win and lose the lottery provides a consistent estimate 
of the impact of winning the lottery.
In the presence of J independently conducted lotteries, we could in prin-
ciple generate J diﬀerent estimates j that capture the marginal impact of 
being allowed admission to the school represented by lottery j:
(1)  j  E(Y i⏐Winij  1; Applyij  1)  E(Y i⏐Winij  0; Applyij  1),
where Y is some outcome measure for student i, Winij is a binary variable 
indicating whether the student won lottery j, and Applyij is a binary variable 
equal to one if the student applied to the lottery and zero otherwise. Then, j 
indicates whether winners are systematically higher or lower on the outcome 
Y than losers in the same lottery. Note that it is also legitimate to estimate 
separate treatment eﬀects for subgroups of students, as long as the sample 
is split according to characteristics that are predetermined at the time of 
application.
While j is clearly an unbiased estimate of the impact of winning this lot-
tery, it is important to consider its interpretation. The parameter measures 
the impact of winning conditional on deciding to apply, which means that 
any ﬁ  ndings may not generalize to nonapplicants. Also, because not all win-
ners choose to attend the lottery school, j measures the impact of having 
the option to attend the lottery school, or the intention- to- treat (ITT) eﬀect. 
One can also infer the treatment eﬀect for actually attending the lottery 
school, called the treatment- on- the- treated (TOT) eﬀect, by scaling the ITT 
eﬀect by the increased likelihood of attending the school for winners. For 
example, if winners are 50 percentage points more likely to attend, then the 
impact of actually attending would be twice as large as the observed mean 
diﬀerence in outcomes between winners and losers.
In practice, the standard errors for particular lotteries and subgroups 
within lotteries in our data are too large to make such school-  speciﬁ  c esti-
mates informative. Therefore, we instead pool information across the lot-
teries:
(2)  Y i  (Win_Lotteryia)  (Lotterya)  eia,56        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
where the subscripts i and a index students and applications, respectively. 
Variable Win_Lotteryia is a binary variable that indicates whether applica-
tion a for student i was a lottery winner, Lotterya is a vector of ﬁ  xed eﬀects 
indicating the lottery to which the observation refers, and e is a stochastic 
error term. In this speciﬁ  cation, the  coeﬃcient is simply a weighted average 
of the j’s for the various lotteries.9
The unit of analysis in this model is a student-  application. Students will 
appear more than once in the data if they applied for multiple lotteries. 
Moreover, a student who won one lottery but lost another lottery will serve 
as a member of the “treatment group” in the ﬁ  rst case, and a member of the 
“control group” in the second case.10 While this setup may seem odd, it builds 
on the logic of estimating separate lottery eﬀects and does indeed produce 
consistent parameter estimates. For the intuition, recall that winners and 
losers in each lottery will be balanced along all observed and unobserved 
dimensions due to the randomization. While a certain fraction of winners 
in any given lottery may have applied to and won other lotteries, the same 
is true for losers in that lottery. Our estimates capture the impact of win-
ning a lottery conditional on the set of other lotteries to which an individual 
applied to and may have won. What multiple applications do inﬂ  uence is 
the magnitude of the treatment eﬀect (e.g., the change in the quality of the 
school attended) associated with winning any given lottery.
In addition to pooling applications across lotteries, we pool student out-
come information across the years 2001 to 2005 to further increase preci-
sion. Rather than estimating equation (2) separately by year, we form a 
panel where the unit of observation becomes the application by year since 
the application. We then estimate ordinary least-  squares regressions of the 
form:11
(3)  Y it  (Win_Lotteryia)  (Lotterya)  Xi  (git)  eita.
The speciﬁ  cations include separate indicators for each cohort, initial appli-
cation grade, and current year combination (git), to absorb mean diﬀerences 
across students who applied in diﬀerent years and to diﬀerent grades and are 
observed in a diﬀerent number of years since application. We also include 
a set of student demographic and home census tract characteristics, as well 
as variables measuring the number and types of applications submitted by 
9. The weight for lottery j is equal to NjPj(1 –   P j)/[∑jNjP j(1 –   P j)], where Nj is the number of 
students entered in lottery j and P j is the proportion of students entered in lottery j who win the 
lottery. Holding the likelihood of winning constant, weights are proportional to the number 
of students in the lottery. The closer a lottery is to having half the applicants win, the more 
weight it receives.
10. On average, students in our analysis sample participate in two lotteries, and the typical 
winner has about a one in ﬁ  ve chance of winning another lottery (as does the typical loser).
11. For the binary dependent variables, we conﬁ  rmed that the reported coeﬃcients estimated 
from linear probability models are always quite similar to the mean marginal eﬀects estimated 
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the student, that are all predetermined at the time of application (Xi). These 
covariates increase precision by absorbing residual variation. Since the lot-
tery balances students along these dimensions, the results will not be sensi-
tive to this conditioning unless there is selective attrition from the sample, 
under which circumstances these controls will then help to mitigate any 
bias. In order to account for correlation in outcomes for the same student 
across applications and years, we report robust standard errors that allow 
for clustering at the student level. This clustering ensures that we do not 
overstate the precision of our inferences by recognizing that observations 
from the same student do not provide as much independent information as 
observations from diﬀerent students.12
2.4    Results
In this section, we present the main results of our analysis. We begin by 
providing some basic statistics on the diﬀerences in student performance and 
school quality between more and less advantaged students in the Chicago 
Public Schools. We then explore the relationship between school quality and 
student outcomes in CPS using a common but naïve approach—namely, 
simple regression analysis that does not account for student self-  selection 
into magnet schools. Third, we turn to our lottery sample in order to better 
isolate the causal impact of attending a sought- after school. Before present-
ing our main ﬁ  ndings, we show a set of results aimed at exploring the scope 
for diﬀerential attrition. In presenting the main results of our analysis, we 
pay careful attention to understanding the magnitude of the eﬀects, the 
statistical power of the estimates, and the distinction between ITT and TOT 
estimates.
2.4.1      A Preliminary Look at Diﬀerences in Student 
Outcomes and School Quality in Chicago
Table 2.1 presents some descriptive statistics to highlight the diﬀerences 
in school quality and academic performance between more and less advan-
taged children in CPS. It is worth noting that the diﬀerences revealed in these 
ﬁ  gures are likely an understatement of the actual diﬀerences since the most 
advantaged families in the Chicago metropolitan area do not attend CPS, 
with one in every ﬁ  ve elementary students opting instead for private schools. 
The table compares students along three dimensions of socioeconomic sta-
tus: race/  ethnicity, individual poverty status, and neighborhood poverty 
status. The statistics are based on the sample of all third grade students 
enrolled in CPS in 2004 and 2005. These are the same years that the major-
ity of our applicants, those applying for kindergarten slots, are enrolled in 
12. Where appropriate, we tested sensitivity to allowing for clustering at the level of the school 
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third grade. Each column presents means for the subsample indicated by 
the column heading.
The top panel documents dramatic diﬀerences in performance between 
advantaged and disadvantaged students. The average standard reading and 
math scores of white third grade students in CPS are both 194, which are 
substantially above the overall national averages of 185. However, black 
and hispanic children in Chicago score roughly twenty points lower than 
white children, implying a deﬁ  cit of more than one year of learning. Similar 
diﬀerences are apparent when low- income students who are eligible for free 
or reduced- price lunch13 and/ or live in high poverty neighborhoods are com-
pared with their more advantaged peers.
The bottom panel reveals equally striking diﬀerences in school qual-
ity.14 White children are nearly six times more likely to attend academically 
advanced schools and nearly twice as likely to attend magnet schools relative 
to black and hispanic children. Similarly, students who are not eligible for 
free or reduced- price lunch attend schools where mean third grade test scores 
are roughly ten points—or two- thirds of a year’s worth of learning—higher 
than eligible students.15 Of course, this may simply reﬂ  ect the fact that more 
advantaged students have higher initial ability levels than disadvantaged stu-
dents. In order to explore the contribution of the school itself, we calculated 
a crude value- added measure for each school equal to the average deviation 
of students’ fourth grade reading and math standard scores from expected, 
given students’ prior scores and demographic characteristics.16 While still 
not perfect, this measure should come a great deal closer to capturing school 
quality than simply the level of achievement. Yet the diﬀerences in school 
value-  added across demographic groups are, if anything, even more strik-
13. Eligibility for the federally assisted meal programs operated in schools is a useful indicator 
of household income. Students are eligible for free (reduced-  price) lunch if income is below 
130 (185) percent of the relevant federal poverty threshold given the household size. The frac-
tion eligible for meal assistance is a measure of student disadvantage commonly factored into 
federal and state funding allocation rules.
14. Natural dimensions of school quality that we do not consider include ﬁ  nancial resources 
and teacher quality. In CPS, funding is allocated largely by formula whereby schools with larger 
populations of poor, special education, and language minority students receive compensatory 
funding, making it diﬃcult to interpret higher levels of expenditures as a signal of quality. 
Some information on teacher characteristics by school is available, but we were unable to ﬁ  nd 
a measure that both varied across schools and had an unambiguous association with the qual-
ity of instruction.
15. This score is the average composite reading and math standard score for third grade 
students in the 2000 and 2001 cohorts at the school. This is the group of students attending 
when our sample was in the process of applying.
16. Speciﬁ  cally, using all fourth graders in 2000 and 2001, we separately regressed reading and 
math standard scores on demographic variables (race/  ethnicity, gender, age, and free/  reduced-
  price lunch eligibility) and twenty indicators each for location of third grade reading and of 
third grade math scores by 5 percentile point ranges of the third grade test score distribution. 
The control variables explain approximately 60 and 70 percent of the variation in fourth grade 
reading and math scores, respectively. We then predict the residuals, and average these residuals 
across students by campus.60        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
ing than the diﬀerences in achievement levels. Black and hispanic children 
in CPS, for example, attend schools with value-  added scores close to zero 
whereas white children attend schools with value-  added scores of roughly 
0.7, indicating that students at these schools improve nearly one point each 
year relative to similar CPS students at less eﬀective schools.
The statistics presented in table 2.1 paint a portrait of a school system with 
highly unequal outcomes across demographic groups, and provide some 
evidence that children from more advantaged backgrounds attend higher 
quality schools. This does not prove that the diﬀerences in school quality 
are responsible for the diﬀerences in student outcomes, however. Indeed, 
this type of correlation is exactly what one would expect if children from 
more advantaged families have a greater inclination and/  or ability to ﬁ  nd a 
good school for their children and also provide the type of home support 
that fosters high academic achievement.
Table 2.2 explores the correlation between school quality and student 
achievement more closely. Using the same sample (i.e., all third grade stu-
dents enrolled in CPS in 2004 and 2005), we estimate a series of regressions 
where the dependent variable is the average of the student’s third grade 
reading and math standard scores. Each column presents the results from 
a separate regression, with the diﬀerence being the speciﬁ  c set of controls 
included. In all cases, the control set includes student demographic and 
neighborhood characteristics as detailed in the notes to the table. Our goal 
is to see to what extent it appears that diﬀerent levels of school quality can 
help to explain outcome inequities across student groups, under the assump-
tion that students who choose to attend better schools would otherwise have 
similar outcomes to other students. These results provide a benchmark for 
comparison to our later results.
The speciﬁ  cation in column (1) shows the relationship between student 
achievement and student race and poverty status with no school-  level con-
trols. We see that black and hispanic children score seven to eight points 
lower than otherwise similar white children, and students eligible for free or 
reduced-  price lunch score roughly nine points lower than otherwise similar 
ineligible students. These diﬀerences are large relative to the scale of the 
scores, as every ﬁ  fteen points represents the amount of learning a typical 
student can expect in a year.
In column (2), we control for both the school mean achievement level as 
well as the school value-  added measure, both of which are calculated for 
earlier cohorts of students in the school so that they are not “mechanically” 
related to the performance of students in our analysis sample. We see a 
signiﬁ  cant positive relationship between both school quality measures and 
student outcomes. For example, the coeﬃcient of 0.58 on mean achievement 
level indicates that students who attend schools where prior students scored 
ten points higher score, on average, 5.8 points higher themselves. Perhaps 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.62        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
noticeably when these school quality measures are included. Even condi-
tional on these measures of the quality of the school attended, however, 
poor and minority children substantially underperform their peers, scoring 
ﬁ  ve to six points lower.
These two variables may well miss many important aspects of school qual-
ity, however. For this reason, the speciﬁ  cation in column (3) adds separate 
indicators for each school to the control set, so that the estimates shown here 
come from a comparison of students within the same schools. While there 
may still be some within-  school diﬀerences in school quality across race or 
poverty status (e.g., special enrichment programs for higher-  achieving stu-
dents in the school, or ability tracking that places more advantaged students 
with better teachers), this approach will account for any diﬃcult- to- measure 
school- level quality factors, such as the ability of the principal or the level of 
parent/ community involvement. We continue to ﬁ  nd that poor and minority 
children score ﬁ  ve to seven points lower than their peers in the same school. 
This comparison provides a useful bound on the potential impact of school 
quality. These results tell us that even if we attribute as great a role as possible 
to schools by ignoring that able students are likely to choose better schools, 
completely equalizing school quality would reduce the achievement gap by 
less than one-  ﬁ  fth to one-  third.
Why are the estimates of the impact of school quality likely to be over-
stated in these regressions? The primary concern is that it does not account 
for unobservable factors such as student motivation or family support that 
might be correlated with school quality and student performance. While it 
appears that better schools lead to better outcomes, it may simply be that 
better students attend these schools, and would perform well regardless—
and vice versa for worse students. The speciﬁ  cations in columns (4) and (5) 
introduce proxies for motivation and ability to test how these moderate the 
results. Our proxies come from our application data. We know which of these 
students expressed an interest in attending a choice school for kindergarten. 
The results show that students who applied to any lottery-  based or aca-
demically advanced (i.e., test- based) magnet school do in fact score between 
three and seven points higher than other students. Notably, adding these 
two indicators reduces the point estimate for the eﬀect of mean school peer 
achievement by more than 10 percent. Column (5), which includes school 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects, shows that applicants are outperforming students attending 
the same schools. Clearly, students who seek out better schools are not like 
other students.
Table 2.3 directly compares our sample of lottery participants and the 
general CPS population. Column (1) begins by displaying the summary 
statistics for the full sample of participants in our nondegenerate lottery 
sample. Columns (2) and (3) focus on students enrolled in pre- kindergarten 
at the time of the applications, comparing lottery participants (column [2]) 
with students who were not observed submitting any applications to choice Table 2.3  Summary statistics for lottery applicants






Background characteristic   (1)   (2)   (3)   (2) – (3)
Student characteristics
Applying to kindergarten 0.720 1 — —
Applying to 1st grade 0.280 0 — —
White 0.156 0.122 0.076 0.047∗∗
Black 0.620 0.526 0.475 0.051∗∗
Hispanic 0.161 0.239 0.416 –0.177∗∗
Asian 0.058 0.107 0.032 0.075∗∗
Male 0.492 0.508 0.520 –0.012
Age on Sept. 1 of school year 
 following  application
5.77 5.53 5.57 –0.05∗∗
Eligible for free/reduced-  price luncha n.a. 0.412 0.799 –0.387∗∗
Living with a biological parenta n.a. 0.876 0.813 0.063∗∗
Enrolled in CPS at the time of 
 application
0.303 1 1 —
Received special education in PKa n.a. 0.073 0.108 –0.035∗∗
Received bilingual education in PKa n.a. 0.260 0.314 –0.054∗∗
Tract poverty rate 0.208 0.212 0.261 –0.049∗∗
Tract fraction completed at least some 
 college
0.492 0.465 0.363 0.102∗∗
Predicted 3rd grade composite score 192.0 192.1 180.7 11.4∗∗
Default kindergarten school characteristics
Fraction eligible for free/reduced-  price 
 lunch
0.860 0.869 0.902 –0.033∗∗
Fraction black 0.591 0.507 0.493 0.014
Fraction hispanic 0.270 0.327 0.400 –0.073∗∗
Mean peer composite 3rd grade score 179.2 179.5 178.6 0.9∗∗
Mean value-  added 3rd–4th grades   0.157   0.155   –0.237   0.392∗∗
Notes: The unit of observation is the student. There are 7,469 students participating in at least one of the 
lotteries included in our analysis. Mean characteristics for these lottery participants are shown in column 
(1). Column (2) restricts the sample to the 1,309 lottery participants enrolled in CPS in pre-  kindergarten 
at the time of the application. There are 31,050 students enrolled in pre-  kindergarten in CPS in spring 
2000 and spring 2001 that we do not observe submitting an application to a choice school. Mean char-
acteristics for these students are shown in column (3). n.a.  not available.
aThese variables are only available for students enrolled in CPS at the time of application.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.64        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
schools (column [3]). The ﬁ  rst point to note is that lottery participants tend 
to be relatively more advantaged than other CPS students on a variety of 
dimensions. Participants are disproportionately white and asian relative to 
the broader CPS population, and they live in neighborhoods with lower 
poverty rates. As a way to quantify the implications of these diﬀerences for 
achievement, we predicted third grade scores for these students as a func-
tion of student and neighborhood background characteristics.17 Given the 
diﬀerences in these, lottery participants would be predicted to score more 
than eleven points higher on average on future reading and math exams 
than nonapplicants.
The bottom panel of table 2.3 demonstrates that lottery participants and 
nonapplicants have access to neighborhood schools of somewhat unequal 
quality. The neighborhood elementary schools for lottery participants have 
lower proportions of students who receive free or reduced-  price lunch, 
and higher achievement levels and value-  added. Since lottery participants 
are generally applying to higher-  ranking schools than their neighborhood 
schools, diﬀerential take-  up of school choice will tend to lead to larger 
diﬀerences in the characteristics of the schools actually attended than those 
that are observed for the default school.
Given these diﬀerences, it is reasonable to ask whether the relationship 
between student demographics, school quality, and student performance 
operate diﬀerently within our sample of lottery participants relative to the 
general CPS population. It is possible, for example, that lottery participants 
come from supportive family environments that mitigate the importance of 
school quality for these students. To explore this possibility, columns (6) to 
(8) of table 2.2 reproduce our cross-  sectional regressions of student perfor-
mance on student characteristics and school quality for our analysis sample. 
The results in column (6) indicate that race and poverty gaps are even larger 
among our lottery sample. The estimated eﬀect of school quality in column 
(7) suggests that peer ability continues to be correlated with individual per-
formance in the analysis sample.18
In summary, it appears that lottery participants diﬀer from other CPS stu-
dents in many important and readily observable ways, such as race and pov-
erty status. Moreover, the results in columns (4) to (5) of table 2.2 indicate 
that lottery participants diﬀer along other unobservable dimensions that 
exert an additional inﬂ  uence on their academic performance. It is precisely 
for this reason that lottery-  induced randomization is likely to be important 
17. Speciﬁ  cally, we regressed third grade reading and math standard scores (separately) 
on the background characteristics that are available for all applicants and enrolled students: 
race/  ethnicity, gender, and the set of home tract variables detailed in the notes to table 2.2. We 
then averaged the two predicted values for each student.
18. Mean value-  added is no longer statistically signiﬁ  cantly related to own achievement, 
though the point estimate is still sizeable. The loss of precision is attributable to a correlation 
between the two school quality measures that is twice as strong in the analysis sample.Is Gaining Access to Selective Elementary Schools Gaining Ground?    6 5
for drawing conclusions about the causal impact of school quality on the 
students in our sample. We now turn to this task.
2.4.2      Using Lotteries to Estimate the Causal Impact 
of School Quality on Student Outcomes
The Lottery Schools
Students in our analysis sample applied to at least one of thirty-  two 
schools that admitted students through a competitive lottery. Table 2.4 
illustrates that these schools vary widely in terms of quality. In column (1), 
for example, we see that the average third grade test scores in these schools 
ranged from 206 in LaSalle Language Academy to 176 in Ericson Scholastic 
Academy. This thirty- point diﬀerence is equivalent to two entire years worth 
of learning. In other words, the average third grade student in LaSalle is 
roughly two years ahead of the average student at Ericson. In the majority 
of the lottery schools, however, students scored above the national average 
(i.e., 185 points), a considerable feat considering the high levels of poverty in 
CPS and that none of these schools accept students on the basis of academic 
ability. Column (2) shows that students at most of these schools are learning 
at a faster rate than otherwise similar students in CPS, since the value- added 
measures are generally positive. Finally, columns (3) and (4) report measures 
reﬂ  ecting the popularity of the schools. Column (3) shows the fraction of 
applicants who were rejected, which captures the competitiveness of the lot-
tery. Column (4) shows the fraction of lottery winners who actually choose 
to enroll in the school when given the opportunity.
There is substantial variation across schools along all of these dimensions. 
Schools with high mean achievement tend to be popular with students, as 
measured by either the competitiveness of the lotteries or the take-  up rates 
of lottery winners (the correlation between columns [1] and [3] is .56 and 
between columns [1] and [4] is .64). Notably, the schools that we identify 
as high value-  added are somewhat less popular schools (the correlations 
between our value- added measure and the acceptance and take- up rates are 
both .45). In terms of the number of lottery participants, the high- achieving 
schools are overrepresented.
Empirical Concern 1: Valid Randomization
The key to our research design rests on the assumption that admission 
to our sample of schools was determined randomly. The CPS oﬃcials indi-
cate that the lotteries used to determine admission were conducted using 
a computer algorithm that generated random numbers. However, given 
the importance of this issue, we conﬁ  rm that the randomization indeed 
occurred. If the lotteries were conducted properly, then one would predict 
that the winners and losers of a given lottery will be, on average, perfectly 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.68        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
the cross-  sectional equation (2) for a series of student demographic and 
neighborhood variables that are predetermined at the time of the lottery, as 
well as variables capturing the number and types of applications submitted 
by the student. In results not presented here (but available from the authors 
upon request), we ﬁ  nd that the number of statistically signiﬁ  cant diﬀerences 
between winners and losers are no more than would be expected by chance 
if the lotteries were, in fact, truly random. Hence, we conclude that the lot-
teries were conducted properly.
Empirical Concern 2: Selective Attrition
Even if the lotteries are valid randomizations, however, the fact that 
not all applicants end up enrolling in CPS may bias our ﬁ  ndings since we 
only observe subsequent student outcomes for CPS students. Of course, if 
the students who choose to remain in CPS are identical to their peers who 
choose to leave CPS, then the attrition of some students from our sample will 
not inﬂ  uence the results of our analysis. On the other hand, if this attrition 
is nonrandom, then it could bias our ﬁ  ndings. For example, imagine that 
high-  achieving students’ decisions about whether to remain in a city public 
school are more sensitive to whether they win the lottery at a choice school 
or not. That is, they are more likely to stay if they win, and to leave if they 
lose. In this case, the sample of winners we observe in subsequent years will 
contain a disproportionate share of these “good” students relative to the 
sample of lottery losers—even if the full sample of winners and losers were 
identical at the time of the lottery. This type of attrition would lead us to 
overstate the beneﬁ  ts of winning a lottery and attending a higher quality 
school. Conversely, if students who leave CPS when they lose the lottery tend 
to be the lower-  achieving students (which might be the case if families are 
more concerned about prospects for an “at- risk” child in a traditional public 
school), then our results would tend to understate any beneﬁ  ts of attending 
a higher quality school.
We provide evidence on the degree of overall attrition and test for whether 
it is selective in table 2.5. The ﬁ  rst row shows results from estimating equation 
(3) with an indicator for enrollment in CPS as the dependent variable, for the 
overall sample and for various student subgroups. We do not condition on 
observable characteristics for these diagnostic analyses—the only variables 
included as controls are the set of lottery indicators. Recall that we pool 
observations across multiple years, so that this outcome indicates whether 
a student is enrolled in CPS in each year following the lottery. As a baseline, 
it is useful to consider the fraction of lottery losers subsequently enrolled 
in CPS. The fraction .527 in square brackets in the ﬁ  rst column indicates 
that the typical lottery loser is enrolled in 52.7 percent of post- lottery years. 
The fact that relatively few students end up enrolling reﬂ  ects the selective 
nature of the sample. The students who applied for choice schools indicated 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.70        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
The estimated coeﬃcients on the indicator for being selected in the lottery 
for that application reveals that, while many students in our sample choose 
to attend school outside of CPS, the diﬀerence in enrollment between win-
ners and losers is modest. For example, the coeﬃcient of .050 in column (1) 
indicates that students who win a lottery are ﬁ  ve percentage points more 
likely to be enrolled in CPS in subsequent years than their counterparts in 
the same lottery who are not selected. Given the baseline enrollment rate of 
52.7 percent, we infer that selection in the lottery increases the likelihood of 
enrolling by roughly 9 percent.
While the extent of diﬀerential attrition is modest, if the students who left 
CPS because they did not win a lottery were substantially diﬀerent from their 
counterparts who won a lottery and therefore remained, we would be con-
cerned about the validity of our estimates. Row 2 explores this concern by 
examining the subsample of winners and losers enrolled in CPS. Rather than 
examine a series of background characteristics separately, we use a summary 
measure—namely, the student’s predicted third grade achievement score 
(reading and math combined). We predict this on the basis of a linear regres-
sion that includes a host of student and neighborhood characteristics at the 
time of application, as well as indicators for the number of applications and 
acceptances to test-  based schools observed for the student.
If the lottery losers who left were systematically diﬀerent than their win-
ning counterparts who remained, we would expect there to be a signiﬁ  cant 
relationship between selection in the lottery and student characteristics 
among enrolled students. However, as we see in row 2, there is no such 
relationship across the subsamples we examine, other than for low-  income 
students, where winners appear to be slightly negatively selected. More-
over, the estimates are small in magnitude and precisely estimated across 
the board. For example, the estimate of –  0.15 in column (1) is tiny relative 
to the standard deviation of the predicted third grade score measure (10.75) 
shown in brackets. This provides some evidence that the diﬀerential attrition 
we observe overall and across demographic groups will not skew our baseline 
estimates.19 However, we reconsider the issue of selective attrition when 
we examine whether the eﬀect of winning a lottery varies according to the 
induced change in school quality or the family’s revealed preference for 
academics, since any diﬀerences between winners and losers could be exag-
gerated in these types of sample splits.
2.4.3      Baseline Estimates of the Eﬀect of Winning 
a Lottery on Student Outcomes
Having established that lottery applicants diﬀer in important observable 
and unobservable ways from nonapplicants, the choice- school lotteries were 
19. Of course, it is still possible that winners who were induced to remain in CPS are diﬀerent 
in unobservable ways (e.g., they have more or less supportive families), which could lead to a 
bias in our ﬁ  ndings.Is Gaining Access to Selective Elementary Schools Gaining Ground?    7 1
indeed random, and selective attrition is unlikely to be a substantial concern 
in our analysis, we now proceed to our main results, shown in table 2.6. 
Each column refers to a diﬀerent student subgroup and each row reports 
the results for a diﬀerent outcome variable. Though we present results for 
various student subgroups, we focus our discussion on the overall results 
where the precision of our estimates is greatest. In each case, our estimates 
are based on ordinary least squares regressions of the type shown in equa-
tion (3), pooling across years since the application. Robust standard errors 
clustered by student are shown in parentheses, and the mean of the outcome 
variable for lottery losers is shown in square brackets.
We ﬁ rst present results that characterize the nature of the treatment for 
winners. How does winning aﬀect their schooling? The top row of table 
2.6 shows the likelihood of attending the lottery school, conditional on 
enrolling in CPS. If all winners chose to attend the lottery school to which 
they applied and the losers were precluded from attending, we would expect 
to ﬁ  nd a point estimate of 1, indicating that winning the lottery shifts the 
likelihood of attending the lottery school from 0 to 100 percent. That is 
not what we see. In our case, 8.2 percent of lottery losers end up enrolling 
in the school, likely moving oﬀ the waitlist. The estimate of 0.312 indicates 
that students who won the lottery were 31.2 percentage points more likely 
to attend that school, implying that winners take up the option to attend 
approximately 39 percent of the time. So, while the attendance rate is nearly 
ﬁ  ve times higher among winners than losers, less than half of the students 
who win a lottery end up attending the school. This is not surprising since 
about one in ﬁ  ve of the winners in any given lottery included in our analysis 
had successful applications to at least one other lottery-  based school, and 
many also applied to the academically advanced programs with selective 
admissions. However, it is due to this slippage that any diﬀerences in mean 
outcomes between winners and losers have to be scaled up in order to be 
interpreted as impacts of attending the lottery school.
Rows 2 and 3 characterize the change in exposure to school quality that 
is induced by winning a lottery. For example, the estimates in row 2 for the 
overall sample indicate that students who won a lottery attend schools where 
students from prior cohorts scored roughly 2.3 points higher than at schools 
attended by lottery losers. Given a standard deviation of 12.1 points among 
the control group, this translates into a 20 percent increase in this measure 
of school quality. The results in row 3 indicate that winning a lottery also 
increases the quality of the school a child attends as measured in terms of 
value-  added, and to a similar degree.
However, it is again important to realize that these estimates only reﬂ  ect 
the eﬀect of winning the lottery, not the eﬀect of actually attending the 
lottery school. For example, in order to obtain an estimate of the eﬀect 
of attending the lottery school for which the student gained admission on 
mean peer achievement, it is necessary to divide 2.3 by the estimate of the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.74        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
ﬁ  nds that students who actually attend the lottery school after winning a 
lottery experience peers who score roughly 7 points higher in reading and 
math (2.3/  .312 ≈ 7.4 points, or more than 60 percent of the control group 
standard deviation) than they would have had they lost the lottery. This 
suggests that attending a sought-  after school can substantially change a 
student’s educational experience.
Now that we have established that winners are attending what appear to 
be better schools, the bottom panel of table 2.6 evaluates whether this leads 
to better academic outcomes.20 The outcome measures include an indica-
tor for whether the student is repeating a grade (deﬁ  ned starting after the 
ﬁ  rst year following the application), an indicator for whether the student 
currently receives special education services, an indicator for whether ITBS 
test scores from the spring administration are available for the student, and 
the student’s composite (reading and math) test score. Recall that we are 
estimating these results on a panel that includes either four or ﬁ  ve years of 
outcome data for each student.
Focusing on the results for the full sample of students shown in column 
(1), we ﬁ  nd little evidence that winning the lottery had any impact on student 
achievement. Despite the fact that winners, on average, attend schools with 
higher achievement levels and value-  added measures, test scores of these 
students are virtually identical to their peers who lost the lottery. There 
is no indication that these students were any more or less likely to receive 
special education services, to be retained in grade, or to take the standard-
ized exams.
While the average student does not appear to beneﬁ  t from winning a 
lottery, it is possible that the opportunity to attend a more desirable school 
has a greater impact for disadvantaged students. To explore this possibility, 
columns (2) through (8) of table 2.6 present results separately for various 
subgroups. Looking at the subgroup analyses in columns (2) through (8), 
we see no evidence that winning a lottery had a discernible positive impact 
on test scores for any subgroup.
While these results suggest that attending a higher quality school does not 
improve academic achievement for young children, it is worth exploring the 
magnitude and precision of our estimates more carefully. To begin, recall 
that the estimates presented in table 2.6 reﬂ  ect the average diﬀerence between 
lottery winners and losers regardless of the school they end up attending. 
This ITT estimate captures the eﬀect of the opportunity to attend the school, 
where the treatment refers to attendance at the school. As shown previously, 
in order to understand the eﬀect of attending a lottery school, one needs to 
divide the outcome estimates by the ﬁ  gures shown in row 1. Doing so for 
20. However, even without changes in observable school quality, winners should presum-
ably beneﬁ  t from better match quality. They have gained a schooling option they expressed an 
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the test score result, one gets 0.17/  0.31 ≈ 0.55. We can calculate an approxi-
mate 95 percent conﬁ  dence interval (ignoring the variability in the estimated 
attendance response) of attending the lottery school as 0.55    (0.53/ 0.31) 
	 1.96.  0.55  3.35. This means that attending a sought-  after lottery 
school leads to a change in test performance of –  2.8 to 3.9 points. Given 
the standard deviation of test scores in our control group is 19.6, we can 
rule out average increases in achievement from attending a lottery school 
(for all sample years following the application) of more than 20 percent of 
a standard deviation. Hence, we can rule out modest or large impacts, but 
cannot discount the possibility that attending a choice school has a small 
positive (or negative) impact on achievement.
It is also useful to compare these estimates to our earlier cross-  sectional 
estimates of the impact of mean peer achievement on own achievement. 
The point estimate of 0.52 in column (4) of table 2.2 indicates that a one 
point increase in mean peer achievement is associated with a half a point 
increase in the student’s own third grade test score. The estimates in row 2 
of table 2.6 show that the typical winner attends a school with mean peer 
achievement 2.34 points higher than the typical lottery loser. Together, these 
imply that lottery winners should score 1.2 points (2.34 	 0.52, with an 
approximate 95 percent conﬁ  dence interval of 0.11) higher themselves. 
This is the upper bound of the ITT eﬀect implied by our test score estimate 
of 0.17 (0.53) in table 2.6. Hence, if one believes that there are no other 
channels through which attending a choice school would improve one’s 
achievement, we cannot quite rule out the OLS estimates. However, to the 
extent that there are any other signiﬁ  cant pathways through which choice 
impacts student outcomes (including the demonstrated independent eﬀect 
of measured value-  added), then we can infer the naïve OLS estimates are 
inﬂ  ated.
2.4.4    Interaction  Eﬀects of Winning a Lottery on Student Outcomes
Though we can rule out sizeable academic beneﬁ  ts from winning the lot-
tery on average, it is possible that the impact varies depending on the nature 
of the treatment and the reasons for choosing the application schools. We 
present results from speciﬁ  cations that allow for diﬀerential impacts along 
these lines in table 2.7.
The ﬁ  rst row of table 2.7 explores whether our estimates vary by the num-
ber of years since the application. Recall that our sample includes informa-
tion on student outcomes for up to ﬁ  ve years following application. To the 
extent that the eﬀects of attending a high quality school are cumulative, we 
would expect the beneﬁ  t of attending a choice school to increase with time. 
To explore this possibility, we estimate the speciﬁ  cation shown in equation 
(3), but include an interaction between being selected in the lottery and years 
since application (with the ﬁ  rst year normalized to zero). Note that the main 
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set (i.e., the indicators for each cohort, initial application grade, and current 
year combination).
The table shows results for four diﬀerent outcomes. In order to examine 
whether attrition changed across years since the application, columns (1a) 
and (1b) show the main eﬀect for being selected and the interaction with 
years since application for a model where the outcome measure is an indica-
tor for whether the student was enrolled in CPS. The coeﬃcient of – 0.011 on 
the interaction between winning a lottery and the number of years since the 
application indicates that the diﬀerence in enrollment rates between lottery 
winners and losers shrinks over time. In the initial year after the application, 
lottery winners are estimated to be 6.9 percentage points more likely to be 
enrolled. Five years following the application, winners are only 2.5 percent-
age points (6.9 –  4 	 1.1) more likely to be enrolled in CPS. This convergence 
between winners and losers is driven both by further exit from CPS of some 
lottery winners as well as later entry by lottery losers.
In order to examine whether selective attrition changed across years since 
the application, columns (2a) and (2b) show the main eﬀect and interaction 
term for a model where the outcome measure is the student’s predicted third 
grade test score. There is no evidence that selective attrition diﬀered as time 
elapsed.
The results in columns (3a) and (3b) focus on the mean peer achievement 
in the school(s) that the student actually attends, which provides an indica-
tion of the “treatment” eﬀect of winning a lottery. The coeﬃcient estimate 
of –  0.33 on the interaction term indicates that the “beneﬁ  t” of winning a 
lottery, in terms of the quality of school attended, diminishes somewhat over 
time. This may be due to the fact that students who lost the lottery continue 
to seek opportunities to attend better schools, and so slowly “catch- up” with 
their peers who were initially lucky enough to win the lottery.
Columns (4a) and (4b) show the results for student achievement. Here we 
see no indication that the beneﬁ  t from winning the lottery changed over time. 
The fact that achievement eﬀects do not increase with longer “exposure” 
to the “treatment” (i.e., a longer period of time in the choice school) could 
be taken as further evidence that the link between schools and test scores 
is weak. On the other hand, the fact that the quality diﬀerential diminishes 
over time might serve to mitigate the greater length of exposure. In either 
case, these results speak to the potential importance of compensating behav-
ior on the part of families.
To get more directly at any heterogeneity according to intensity of the 
treatment, row 2 presents a similar speciﬁ  cation where the interaction term 
is the potential gain in mean peer achievement (and we add the main eﬀect 
to the speciﬁ  cation as well). This measure varies by student and appli-
cation, and is deﬁ  ned as the diﬀerence between the peer achievement in 
the application school and the level of peer achievement the student is 
likely to experience if he or she does not win the lottery to the application 78        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
school.21 Not surprisingly, winners are increasingly more likely than los-
ers to enroll as the potential gain increases, though it continues to appear 
that remaining winners and losers are not systematically diﬀerent from one 
another. The change in school quality experienced by winners, by deﬁ  nition, 
increases with the potential gain, as documented in columns (3a) and (3b). 
Yet, we see no interaction between potential gains and achievement eﬀects 
in columns (4a) and (4b). In other words, the eﬀect of winning a lottery is 
no diﬀerent for those students who sought out high- achieving schools com-
pared with otherwise comparable students who applied to schools with lower 
test scores. So, the apparent lack of beneﬁ  ts for the overall sample cannot 
simply be explained by gains for some and losses for others due to diﬀerences 
in what winning confers in terms of changes in the schooling environment.
As a ﬁ  nal test, we consider the possibility that the overall null eﬀect masks 
test score gains from the choices made by students expressly interested in 
academics, and test score losses for those more willing to trade-  oﬀ distance 
or other school features against academic quality. This test is motivated by 
the ﬁ  nding of Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006) that, among non-  white 
students, those students whose parents exhibit the strongest preferences for 
academic quality beneﬁ  t from the opportunity to attend a more-  preferred 
choice school, while those seeking same-  race settings are harmed (in terms 
of test score outcomes). Moreover, the apparent test score gains and losses 
appear to come from idiosyncratic match quality, rather than aspects of 
quality that are enjoyed by all students at a school.
Note that the potential gains interaction described will, to a large extent, 
capture parent preferences for academic quality since the measure incorpo-
rates the family’s choice of application schools. However, this measure varies 
by application as well as student, and also incorporates information on the 
student’s likely default option. To the extent that families who care strongly 
about academics make sure their children attend a high-  achieving school 
regardless of the lottery outcome (e.g., through application to test-  based 
schools), the potential gain measure may understate the family’s preference 
for academics. For these reasons, we create a more direct measure of parent 
preference for academics.
While the structure of the school choice program in Chicago does not 
allow us to calculate the same type of preference measure, we are able to 
create a similar indicator to explore this possibility in our sample. We esti-
mate a regression of the following form:
(4)  Qia  Xi  (Zi)  eia,
where Qia is the average combined (reading and math) test score in the school 
that student i applied to in application a, Xi is a vector of student demo-
21. The expected quality of a student’s alternative options is inferred from the mean experi-
enced by lottery losers from the same neighborhood (there are seventy- seven community areas) 
who are predicted to be in the same quintile of third grade achievement.Is Gaining Access to Selective Elementary Schools Gaining Ground?    7 9
graphics and home tract characteristics, Zi is a vector of community area 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects, and e is a stochastic error term. We then average the residuals 
across applications for each student and use this as a measure of the family’s 
preference for academics. The intuition behind our measure is that the par-
ents who apply to schools with the highest achievement levels—conditional 
on their observable demographics and the neighborhood in which they live, 
which captures the distance to various schooling options—place the greatest 
weight on academics. Note that it is likely that all of the families in our anal-
ysis sample place more weight on academics than the average CPS family 
since they have taken the step of applying for a choice school rather than 
simply attending their default neighborhood school, and we observe average 
improvements in observable school quality for winners (as do Hastings, 
Kane, and Staiger 2006). However, there remains signiﬁ  cant variation in 
revealed preferences among students in our lottery sample, and our measure 
has a standard deviation of six points.
The results in row 3 of table 2.7 are based on a speciﬁ  cation that adds an 
interaction between this academic preference measure and winning the lottery 
(as well as the main eﬀect for the academic preference measure). In columns 
(1a) and (1b), we see that there is a systematic relationship between prefer-
ence for school quality and attrition. Speciﬁ  cally, the coeﬃcient of 0.004 on 
the interaction term in column (1b) indicates that students whose parents 
express a greater preference for academic quality are more likely to leave CPS 
if they lose the lottery. While the diﬀerence in enrollment rates between win-
ners and losers increases with the parents’ preference for academic quality, 
the results in columns (2a) and (2b) provide no evidence that the attrition is 
more selective (along observable dimensions) among high-  preference par-
ents. Of course, it is still possible that student attrition was selective along 
unobservable dimensions such as parental motivation or family support. 
The results in columns (3a) and (3b) show that the improvement in mea-
sured school quality induced by winning does not vary by preferences. This 
is somewhat surprising given that one would expect families with a stronger 
preference for academics to end up in higher-  achieving schools if they win 
the lottery. On the other hand, this result is consistent with the ﬁ  ndings in 
Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006), and likely reﬂ  ects the fact that a family’s 
preferences as measured by application behavior is strongly correlated with 
the student’s next- best alternative. However, unlike the Hastings, Kane, and 
Staiger (2006) analysis of Charlotte-  Mecklenburg, the achievement results 
in columns (4a) and (4b) reveal no test score gains from winning a lottery in 
the Chicago setting, even among high-  preference families.
2.5    Conclusions  and  Implications
The original analysis conducted in this chapter suggests that schools are a 
blunt instrument for improving the achievement of disadvantaged students. 
First, for elementary school students in CPS, we demonstrate that the gap in 80        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
achievement across advantaged and disadvantaged students is two- thirds as 
great within schools as across schools. The great inequities that we observed 
in school quality across these groups, then, cannot explain the bulk of the 
diﬀerences in outcomes. Further, this surely overstates the role for schools. 
Part of the convergence in outcomes within schools as compared to across 
schools is due to the fact that minority and poor students who attend the 
same schools are similar in family background and other characteristics that 
are diﬃcult to measure. These students would have more similar outcomes 
regardless of their shared schooling experience.
We then use lotteries to examine whether elementary school students who 
gain access to desirable schools do better. The great advantage is that ran-
domly selected winners and losers are by deﬁ  nition exchangeable. Although 
students in our sample often take advantage of winning a lottery by attend-
ing that school, and on average lottery winners attend schools that are better 
on observable dimensions than the schools attended by lottery losers, we 
observe no systematic improvement in student performance among winners 
relative to losers. This ﬁ  nding is surprising since students who win con-
tested lotteries would be expected to fare better because of access to better 
resources, better peers, or a program that better suits their learning needs for 
idiosyncratic reasons. The fact that these students do not appear to beneﬁ  t 
further undermines the likelihood that changes in broad aspects of school 
quality will radically change students’ fates.
There are several explanations for the lack of average positive eﬀects. 
One possibility is that attending a choice school is a substitute for parental 
involvement. In prior work, however, we ﬁ  nd only weak support for this 
hypothesis (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006). Another explanation is that stu-
dents winning lotteries may have to travel much greater distances to school, 
which might interfere with academic success. However, in results not shown 
here, we ﬁ  nd that the travel costs experienced by lottery winners appear to 
be quite small, and thus unlikely to explain our results.
The coexistence of intense competition for entry and little academic ben-
eﬁ  t to students winning the lotteries could indicate that parents are not 
well- informed about the education production function, and mistake higher 
school outputs for higher school value-  added. Alternatively, parents and 
children might apply to magnet schools for predominantly nonacademic 
reasons, in which case systematic academic gains would not be expected. 
Indeed, studies of school choice programs that attempt to ascertain parent 
preferences generally conclude that parents value factors such as conve-
nience (i.e., distance from home to school) and the racial composition of 
the school at least as much as measures of academic quality (Glazerman 
1998; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2005). In the Chicago setting, however, we 
are unable to ﬁ  nd evidence that either winning a lottery that induces a large 
change in mean peer achievement or choosing with academic motivations 
in mind confers any greater beneﬁ  ts.Is Gaining Access to Selective Elementary Schools Gaining Ground?    8 1
The type of school choice we analyze in this chapter is particularly rele-
vant to the current federal accountability mandate insofar as our analysis 
focuses on public schools in a large, disadvantaged urban district. This form 
of choice is the most common form of choice available to students in urban 
areas (National Center for Education Statistics 1997), and it is likely to 
become even more prevalent under the recent federal education legislation 
of No Child Left Behind. School districts that accept Title I funds must 
allow students at lagging schools to attend other schools in the district, 
giving preference to low achieving and low income students. We cautiously 
conclude that access to “better” schools is likely to be less eﬀective than more 
targeted interventions.
Appendix
Table 2A.1  Data sources
Data Source   Construction
Academic 
Outcomes
CPS Board Information on enrollment, special education placement, 
and retention is from administrative records provided by 
the Board. Special education status covers a variety of 
disabilities ranging from mild learning disabilities to severe 
physical handicaps. Standardized test scores are from 
separate administrative test ﬁ  les provided by the Board. 
Students are tested in grades 1–8 on the Iowa Test of Basic 
Skills (ITBS), which is a nationally-  normed standardized 
achievement exam. The scores that we use are 
developmental standard scores, which are designed so that 
a unit change represents the same amount of learning at all 
points on the scale.
Student 
Demographics
CPS Board Student demographic variables (race, gender, age) come 
directly from information reported on the applications. 
Eligibility for free or reduced-  price lunch is only available 






  We mapped the home addresses reported on the application 
ﬁ  les to census tracts. Basic information on the student’s 
census tract, such as median household income and percent 
below the poverty line, comes from the 2000 Census. The 
crime composite was provided by the Consortium on 
Chicago School Research (CCSR) and is an index created 
by factor analysis using oﬃcial block group level crime 
statistics for 1994. The variable used in this analysis is a 
tract-  level average, weighted by the total population in each 
block group.82        Julie Berry Cullen and Brian A. Jacob
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